Before Resorting to Politics, by Anthony de Jasay (1996)
Reviewed by:
John Rogers,
Agenda Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 508-510 (1997)
"... Anthony de Jasay, in his essay 'Before Resorting to Politics', appears to agree that utilitarianism has become the dominant true belief among modern liberals, who are liberals merely because they recognise that politics in the large won't work. But by staying within this framework liberals are likely to continue to lose the fight against politics in the small; they can never identify the full consequences of piecemeal government control, and it seems illogical to limit the scope of government, since this may prevent it from 'doing good'. Even more profoundly, utilitarianism has left liberals in a precarious philosophical position, for there are deep problems with the interpersonal measurement and balancing of utilities. As de Jasay says, it is hardly morally justifiable to allow some people's preferences to outweigh others merely because they happen to be in power or are fashionable. Nor will arguing that freedom has some intrinsic philosophical value necessarily work, since, de Jasay argues, as an ultimate good freedom is undermined by a devastating relativism. What if the next person does not value freedom? But positing freedom as the means to an end (as some utilitarians might do) merely wrecks it at one remove.
De Jasay proposes to fill this moral vacuum by arguing that one should be presumed to be free to do the feasible. From this it follows that one should be at liberty to do something, provided that the action is not a tort that breaches someone else's liberty. One should also be able to exercise a right that has been granted by another and should be prevented from breaching voluntarily assumed obligations: that is, people should be able to contract with one another. Such a framework strictly limits coercion to deterring torts and limiting breaches of obligations. That is, if there is any role for government it should be that of the minimal state. The scope of what is validly affected by politics entirely vanishes 'for nothing, neither deductive reasoning nor experimental evidence, proves that property and contract cannot be adequately and economically protected by extra-political means' (p. 35).
De Jasay's moral approach is on very strong ground. The radical alternative to it is to assume that one is not free to do the feasible, and that one is free only to act under government licence or through the exercise of rights granted by government (as under a constitution). Yet this radical alternative is all too often adopted, even by liberals. For instance, Richard Epstein (1985) talks of individuals having 'a right to enter into a contract' based on 'a collective recognition of the entitlement'. As de Jasay says, 'it is not clear why the parties need to enter into an agreement they consider both agreeable and mutually binding' (p. 47). ..."
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