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Sir Edward Coke, 1552 - 1634

Alternative Rules for Determining Tort Liability

Coke's Institutes of the Law, No. 2, Series Editors: Amanda J. Owens & Charles K. Rowley


Proximate Cause

The proximate cause doctrine was discussed in the Negligence section of this Commentary. To illustrate the impact of the proximate cause doctrine when combined with contributory negligence, it is useful to turn to the modern case of Gyerman v. U.S. Lines Co., (1972). In this California case, the plaintiff was a longshoreman working in a warehouse to break down sacks of fishmeal. Fishmeal was a difficult cargo to maneuver, and it was standard practices to stack the bags in a special manner and tie them in. In this instance, the bags were not stacked correctly. A longshoreman is supposed to report unsafe conditions to his supervisor and to stop working immediately. Although complaints were made to the warehouse manager, who worked independently from the longshoreman, the facts are disputed as to any complaints made to the supervisor. After three days the longshoreman was involved in an accident.

The court held that the defendant had not met the burden of proving that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries. The record did not establish that failure to report the dangerous condition was a substantial factor in bringing about the fall of the sacks. Indeed, the court speculated that it was not possible to break the stacks into safer lots. The judges believed that all factors should be taken into account when deciding due care standards. These factors included such vague concerns as one: the longshoreman might have felt powerless just to stop working through fear of danger. Two, the longshoreman was unsure who to complain to about the conditions of the warehouse, and three: the longshoreman may have felt baffled by the obligation to make a determination of imminent harm. These paternalistic concerns influenced the court in the longshoreman's favor despite the fact that the custom was to report hazards to one's own supervisor and to continue work only after permission was received, and that this standard of care was part of the union's collective bargaining agreement.

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