Alternative Rules for Determining Tort Liability
Coke's Institutes of the Law, No. 2, Series Editors: Amanda J. Owens & Charles K. Rowley
Strict Liability
The common law developed a separate doctrine to help plaintiffs to prove their cases for certain situations. The doctrine of strict liability allocates the presumption of responsibility for certain types of accidents to the defendant instead of the plaintiff. This alleviates the burden of proof that usually rests on the plaintiff when trying a case. The courts regarded keeping wild animals and blasting, for example, as inherently dangerous activities. There arose a presumption that if a wild animal escaped, or a blasting accident occurred, the owner of the animal or whoever created the explosion was automatically liable for any injuries which could ordinarily be linked to these events. This raised the social cost to persons who engaged in dangerous activities.
An example of a ferocious animal case is Baker v. Snell, [1908], an English case that concerned a savage dog. One employee had the responsibility of letting the dog out early and chaining it up before the other employees arrived. One day this employee brought the dog into the midst of the other employees and encouraged it to bite. The defendant-employer was strictly liable for the injuries unless he could prove that the employee let the dog loose with malicious intent. The basis for the decision was that if a man chose to keep a ferocious animal then he was bound to keep the animal secure at his own peril.
The application of the strict liability doctrine to blasting is illustrated in the New York case of Spano v. Perini Corp. (1969), that concerned the blasting of a tunnel in New York City. The blast destroyed a neighboring garage as well as a car located inside the garage at the time of the accident. The issue before the court was whether a person who sustained property damage caused by blasting on a nearby property could maintain an action for damages without proving that the blaster was negligent. The Chief Judge Fuld held that the defendants were strictly liable, and there was no need to prove fault:
"Since blasting involves a substantial risk of harm no matter the degree of care exercised, we perceive no reason for ever permitting a person who engages in such an activity to impose this risk upon nearby persons or property without assuming responsibility therefore."
The Utah case of Madsen v. East Jordan Irr. Co., (1942) shows some of the limitations of the strict liability doctrine. Madsen Mink Farm was used to breed and raise mink. On neighboring land, the defendant used explosives to repair a canal. The noise frightened the mother mink and they killed substantial numbers of their offspring. The mother minks' actions broke the chain of causation because the killing of the kittens was not an act of self-preservation, directly related to the blasting, but a reaction based on a peculiarity of disposition. The defendant could not have anticipated this unusual reaction, and so the defendant was not liable. Although the rule of absolute liability prevails when explosives are used, a non-negligent user of explosives is only liable for those things that ordinarily result from an explosion.
As industrialization developed during the eighteenth century, the strict liability doctrine was expanded to include damage caused by certain machines. For example, Powell v. Fall, (1880) concerned liability for property damage when a steam traction engine emitted sparks and set fire to the plaintiff's hay pile on a neighboring farm. Although the engine was not defective and was being driven appropriately, the defendants were liable for the damage caused to the hay pile. During discussion of the case, the court referred to Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868).
Rylands v. Fletcher is the landmark decision for strict liability. The defendant built a reservoir and stored water on his land. The water escaped through an open channel, of which the defendant had no prior knowledge, and flooded the neighbor's mine. The defendant was strictly liable for the damage. The court held that when a man brings or uses a thing of dangerous character on his own land, he must keep it at his own peril and is liable for the consequences if it escapes and does injury to a neighbor. A previous decision, Nichols v. Marsland (1875), concerned a man who stored water on his own land and used all reasonable care to keep it there safely. The defendant was not liable for the escape of water that injured the neighbor because the escape was beyond his control. The court distinguished Rylands v. Fletcher because in the Nichols case an intervening agent caused the water to escape.
The Rylands v. Fletcher theory was expanded upon to include transporting hazardous substances in Siegler v. Kuhlman, (1973). In this Washington State case the plaintiff was killed in an explosion when her car entered a pool of thousands of gallons of gasoline. A truck driver had been towing a tanker and trailer loaded with gasoline when he turned a corner and the trailer came loose and fell onto the road below, disgorging its contents and then bursting into flame. The appeal concerned the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, in which the plaintiff argued that strict liability applied as a matter of law from all of the circumstances of the event. Gasoline is dangerous, and has an even greater potential for harm when carried as freight. The evidence as to the cause of the accident was destroyed because of the escape and explosion of the gas. Strict liability rests on the idea of rectifying a wrong and putting the burden where it should belong as regards to problems of proof. It is applied to situations involving abnormally dangerous activity. Strict liability applied in this case because gasoline transportation was a high-risk activity that created dangers that could not be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care.
There have been examples of cases where attorneys have tried to affect policy by expanding the strict liability doctrine to include even more activities. The comparatively mundane activity of driving was the subject of one of these attempts in Hammontree v. Jenner, (1971). In this case the defendant drove his car into the bicycle repair shop owned by the Hammontrees. Personal injuries were sustained as well as property damage. The defendant claimed that the accident had taken place during an epileptic seizure, and that he had lost control of the car. The plaintiffs rested their argument on strict liability principles. The defendant was on medication to prevent seizures and did not have any warning before the event took place. Previous case law held that negligence principles would determine liability in such circumstances. Strict liability was aimed at manufacturers, retailers and distributors of products engaged in distributing goods to the public. In an interesting example of spurious logic, the court held that entities such as manufacturers were an integral part of the overall producing and marketing enterprise and therefore should bear the cost of injuries from defective parts as well as the profits from such endeavors. However, this policy justification could not extend to drivers, presumably because it would be too burdensome on society. Additionally, it would be inappropriate to have insurance carriers bear the cost of injuries to innocent victims on a strict liability basis.
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